



 

   



  

   

DETENTION BY ANY OTHER NAME
SANDRA G. MAYSON†
ABSTRACT
An unaffordable bail requirement has precisely the same effect as
an order of pretrial detention: the accused person is jailed pending trial.
It follows as a logical matter that an order requiring an unaffordable
bail bond as a condition of release should be subject to the same
substantive and procedural protections as an order denying bail
altogether. Yet this has not been the practice.
This Article lays out the logical and legal case for the proposition
that an order that functionally imposes detention must be treated as an
order of detention. It addresses counterarguments and complexities,
including both empirical and normative ambiguity in the concept of
“unaffordable” bail. It explains in practical terms what it would entail
for a court system to treat unaffordable bail as a detention order. One
hurdle is that both legal and policy standards for pretrial detention are
currently in flux. Recognizing unaffordable bail as a detention order
foregrounds the question of when pretrial detention is justified. This is
the key question the bail reform movement must now confront.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a paradox at the heart of American bail practice. We
rarely deny release on bail and yet we routinely deny release on bail.
Our law strictly limits the outright denial of release on bail;
simultaneously, it has imposed essentially no limit on unaffordable bail
amounts that functionally deny release.
On the one hand, we extol the right to bail as the guarantor of
pretrial liberty. “Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved,” the
Supreme Court has explained, “the presumption of innocence, secured
only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”1 “This
traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered
preparation of a defense and serves to prevent the infliction of
punishment prior to conviction.”2 Both the states and the federal
government have therefore sought to protect the right to pretrial
freedom since the nation’s founding.3 The colonies enshrined a broader
right to bail in their state constitutions than had existed at common
law.4 Almost half retain that original right; the rest strictly limit the

1.
2.
3.
4.

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
Id.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra note 22.
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circumstances in which courts can order an accused person detained.5
The federal Constitution also presumes that pretrial liberty is the norm
and that detention without bail must be a “carefully limited
exception.”6 Federal statutory law requires a full adversarial hearing
and a finding of necessity before a court can order an accused person
held pending trial.7
On the other hand, courts functionally deny bail as a matter of
course by setting money bail conditions that people cannot afford.8
Magistrates announce bail amounts utterly beyond the capacity of the
accused to meet in two-minute, uncounseled hearings, squinting at the
accused on a videolink or in a crowded courtroom, one after the other,
day in and day out. There are few limits and little process in these
proceedings. While the law proclaims pretrial detention a carefully
limited exception, the system casually detains millions of people each
year on bonds they cannot pay.9
This Article argues that it is time to correct the paradox. Courts
and legislatures should recognize that an order imposing unaffordable
bail is an order of pretrial detention. It has precisely the same effect:
the accused person sits in jail.10 A grant of release contingent on an
5. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, 4 CRIM. PROC.
§ 12(3)(b) (4th ed. 2018) (“Because shortcomings in this regard [lack of procedural protections]
can lead to the invalidation of preventive detention schemes on federal due process grounds, state
courts are likely to judicially engraft such protections onto the applicable provisions in the state
constitutions, statutes and court rules to forestall such an event.”).
6. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
7. See id. at 750.
8. Although there is conflict among the courts, most federal courts that have considered the
question have held that unaffordable bail is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Bail Clause. See Colin Starger & Michael Bullock, Legitimacy, Authority, and the Right
to Affordable Bail, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 589, 605–10 (2018) (tracking and evaluating
relevant case law).
9. In 2017, the most recent year for which data is available, “jails reported 10.6 million
admissions, a 19% decline from 2007.” ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL
INMATES
IN
2017,
at
1
(2019),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NGG5-VGA3]. If even half of those admissions are for new charges, the best
available data on rates of pretrial detention on secured bond suggest that the number of people
so detained each year likely reaches into the millions. See infra notes 45–46 and accompanying
text (noting that reported rates of pretrial detention on money bond range from 32 to 53 percent).
10. The term “bail,” as a historical matter, referred to the process by which an accused
person was released pending adjudication of a criminal charge, generally on the basis of an
unsecured pledge by a third party to assure the accused’s appearance at trial. E.g., Holland v.
Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (considering the history of bail and defining bail as “a
means of achieving pretrial release from custody conditioned on adequate assurances”), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 440 (2018). In the recent past, the American bail system has come to rely heavily
on a secured money bond, or “cash bail,” as a condition of release. See Megan Stevenson & Sandra
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impossible condition is not a grant of release at all. It follows that the
legal system should treat an order imposing unaffordable bail as a de
facto denial of bail. This is not to say that unaffordable bail is per se
unlawful. It should simply be subject to equivalent protections for
individual liberty as an order of detention.
The central point here is not new. Courts and commentators have
long observed, in passing, that unattainable bail is functionally
equivalent to no bail.11 Civil rights litigators challenging money-bail
systems are increasingly making this argument in their pleadings and
briefs.12 Yet the principle deserves much greater attention than it has
received. Only a small handful of courts have taken it seriously. The
weight of the doctrine, not to mention pretrial practice, fails to treat
unaffordable bail as a denial of bail. There has been no scholarship
dedicated exclusively to this point.
The principle that unaffordable bail is a de facto detention order
is also important to the future of bail reform. Thus far, reform
campaigns have mostly framed the problem with money-bail systems
in terms of equality: money bail discriminates against the poor.13 That
G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 22–27 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939273

[https://perma.cc/2QKD-GBRV] (charting the history of bail in the U.S. criminal justice system).
Courts charged with “setting bail” typically order release conditional on the accused person
providing security in a given amount, in the form of either cash, property, or a commercial surety.
Id. at 24. If the accused is able to satisfy this condition, he is released. If not, he remains in jail.
11. See infra notes 55–57.
12. E.g., Complaint at 29–30, Allison v. Allen, No. 1:19-cv-01126 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 12, 2019);
Hill v. Hall, No. 3:19-CV-00452, 2019 WL 4928915, at *14 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 7, 2019) (“As in
Weatherspoon, the argument in this case is that the state court’s order setting bail at an amount
Hill had no ability to raise is effectively an order of detention, but that the state court did not
make the individualized findings necessary to justify the detention.”); Complaint at 23–25, Dixon
v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:19-cv-00112 (S.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2019); Complaint at 24, Mock v. Glynn
County, No. 2:18-cv-00025-LGW-RSB, (S.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2018).
13. See, e.g., Thompson v. Moss Point, No. 1:15cv182LG–RHW, 2015 WL 10322003, at *1
(S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2015) (“No person may, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, be held in custody after an arrest
because the person is too poor to post a monetary bond.”); Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34–
MHT, 2015 WL 5387219, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015) (“The Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits ‘punishing a person for his poverty,’ and this includes deprivations of liberty based on
the inability to pay fixed-sum bail amounts.” (citation omitted)); Cooper v. City of Dothan, No.
1:15–CV–425–WKW [WO], 2015 WL 10013003, at *1 (M.D. Ala. June 18, 2015) (recognizing “the
unconstitutionality of a pretrial detention scheme whereby indigent detainees are confined . . .
solely due to their inability to tender monetary amounts in accordance with a master bond
schedule”); Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15–cv–570–HEA, 2015 WL 10013006, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. June 3, 2015) (“No person may, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, be held in custody after an arrest
because the person is too poor to post a monetary bond.”); accord Statement of Interest of the
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is certainly true, and there is now widespread agreement that courts
must consider a person’s “ability to pay” when setting conditions of
release. The problem is that equality is an amorphous concept.14 No
one knows exactly how much equality the Constitution requires
between people with resources and those without.15 If a magistrate
considers a person’s resources but concludes that there is no other way
to ensure his future appearance in court, for instance, can she impose
unaffordable bail? Is any additional process necessary? Does it matter
if the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony?16 Recognizing unaffordable
bail as a detention order, on the other hand, clarifies core questions of
due process: Is detention justified here? What are the substantive and
procedural criteria for incarcerating a person before trial?
Failure to recognize unaffordable bail as a denial of bail,
moreover, will endanger the new systems of pretrial detention and
release that reformers are working so hard to create. During the
“second generation” of bail reform, in the 1980s and 1990s, a number
of states authorized pretrial detention outside of capital cases but
enacted procedural and substantive rules to guide and constrain these
detention regimes, consonant with the general principle that pretrial
detention should be a carefully limited exception.17 Because these
states also retained cash bail without meaningful limits, however,
courts continued to set unaffordable bail in cases they felt might
warrant detention, ignoring the procedures of the detention regimes.18
United States Department of Justice at 1, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC,
ECF Doc. 26 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2015) (“Incarcerating individuals solely because of their inability
to pay for their release, whether through the payment of fines, fees, or a cash bond, violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
14. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982)
(arguing that “equality,” by itself, is an ideal devoid of substance).
15. See Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American Bail, 128 YALE L.J. F. 1098, 1113–19
(2019) (describing federal litigation challenging wealth-based pretrial detention as having
prompted a “crisis of scrutiny” as different courts adopt different degrees of scrutiny to assess
equivalent claims).
16. See generally Shima Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3358662 [https://perma.cc/RTT4-K4AE] (arguing that
bail practice should indeed treat misdemeanor charges differently than felonies).
17. See generally John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail
Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1985) (describing and analyzing this wave of new bail
statutes).
18. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, CTR. FOR LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED
PRACTICES, “MODEL” BAIL LAWS: RE-DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN PRETRIAL RELEASE
DETENTION 30 (2017) [hereinafter SCHNACKE, “MODEL” BAIL LAWS],
AND
http://www.clebp.org/images/04-18-2017_Model_Bail_Laws_CLEPB_.pdf [https://perma.cc/46J7AADK] (“In many states, leaving money in the system allows a convenient (albeit unlawful)
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If cash bail remains an option without constraints on functional
detention, bail-setting courts are likely to use it as an end-run around
pretrial detention provisions.
For both of these reasons, courts, legislatures, and advocates
should recognize that an unaffordable bail condition is tantamount to
a denial of bail and should ensure that it is treated as such. This change
in practice will have to surmount several hurdles. The status quo exerts
powerful inertia, and the fact is that courts generally have not treated
unaffordable bail as a detention order. One explanation is
inadvertence. Bail-setting courts do not always realize that bail is
unaffordable.19 To the extent the problem is practical, it can be
addressed by procedures requiring ability-to-pay determinations and
second-look bail reviews. The deeper argument against equating
unaffordable bail with a denial of bail is that a court can never know
when bail becomes unaffordable because “unaffordability” is not an
objective quality. This argument highlights the complexity of tethering
bail to one’s ability to pay. But determining unaffordability is not
impossible. Although the determination may require a policy
judgment, there is a threshold at which unaffordable bail conditions
amount to a detention order and should be treated as one.
This Article is not a roadmap for bail reform. It does not purport
to identify the highest priority for reform, and it should not be read to
suggest that treating unaffordable bail as a de facto detention order is
sufficient to produce a just pretrial system. There is a live debate
underway across the country as to whether money has any legitimate
place in the pretrial system. In jurisdictions that eliminate money bail
entirely, the point here is moot. Even where money bail does persist,
moreover, treating unaffordable bail as a detention order is
meaningless unless there are real constraints on detention orders.20 The

means of efficiently detaining defendants without the bother of a due process hearing.”); id. at 30
n.36 (reporting author’s experience that courts in Colorado and Wisconsin routinely use money
to detain, ignoring the detention procedures established in those states); infra notes 70–73 and
accompanying text.
19. Bail magistrates may also lack information about how many defendants wind up detained
on unaffordable bail. State courts often lack effective data infrastructure and feedback loops. Cf.
Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 10, at 33 (suggesting “information and feedback” to bail-setting
courts as one mechanism for reform).
20. The federal pretrial system is a cautionary tale. The system has evolved quite permissive
standards for detention in practice. See Hearing on “The Administration of Bail by State and
Federal Courts: A Call for Reform” Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (testimony of Alison Siegler,
Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic) (noting that “the
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aim of this Article is simply to explain one prerequisite for coherence
in pretrial systems that retain some role for money bail.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the current
incoherence in bail practice: we carefully limit the explicit denial of bail
but impose no limits on the functional denial of bail. Part II lays out
the logical and legal case for the proposition that an unaffordable bail
condition must be treated as a denial of bail and considers
counterarguments. Part III explains what this would entail in practice,
drawing on both existing statutory regimes and new model statutes for
illustration. Part IV confronts the fact that legal standards for pretrial
detention are themselves in flux. Treating unaffordable bail as a
detention order foregrounds the question of what substantive and
procedural protections must attend a detention order. This Article
does not solve that issue; that is the challenge ahead for the courts,
legislatures, and advocates striving to rationalize the pretrial system.
I. THE PARADOX IN BAIL PRACTICE
The denial of bail is both an extraordinary and a routine event.
The explicit denial of bail is extraordinary. The functional denial of bail
is routine. This paradox defines pretrial practice in those
jurisdictions—the vast majority—that have not yet undertaken
comprehensive bail reform.
A. Strict Limits on the Explicit Denial of Bail
Anglo-American law has long restricted the explicit denial of bail.
Beginning with the Statute of Westminster of 1275, English law
stipulated a right to bail for most offenses.21 The American colonies
expanded the right further, exempting only capital offenses “where
proof is evident or the presumption great.”22 The first U.S. Congress
federal system detains people at an astronomical rate” and opining that “the federal pretrial
detention system is in crisis”).
21. Statute of Westminster of 1275, 3 Edward I, ch. 15; see also TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE,
NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL 21–40 (2014)
[hereinafter SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL] (providing a broad history of the practice in
Anglo-American jurisprudence).
22. SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL, supra note 21, at 31; see also State v. Brown, 338
P.3d 1276, 1284–88 (N.M. 2014) (chronicling the history of bail in the United States); June
Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the
Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 531–32 (1983) (“[T]he Pennsylvania provision
[providing that ‘all Prisoners shall be Bailable by Sufficient Sureties, unless for capital Offenses,
where proof is evident or the presumption great’] became the model for almost
every state constitution adopted after 1776.”); Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental
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followed suit in the Judiciary Act of 1789.23 As the Supreme Court has
recognized, a broad right to bail is fundamental to our constitutional
order.24
The right to bail has eroded somewhat in recent decades,
especially in the federal system.25 In 1984, responding to a perceived
rise in pretrial crime, Congress revised federal bail law to permit the
pretrial detention of accused persons deemed to present an
unmanageable threat or flight risk.26 The Bail Reform Act of 1984
authorized detention for defendants charged with an array of
noncapital offenses.27 A number of states also amended their
constitutional right-to-bail provisions to provide for preventive
detention regimes.28
Even in these jurisdictions, however, the law on the books at least
purports to limit the denial of bail to extraordinary circumstances.
Upholding the preventive detention provisions of the federal Bail
Reform Act of 1984 against constitutional challenge, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the regime limited detention eligibility to those

and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909, 912 (2013) (“In state constitutions, from the
Founding through the Nixon era, the right to bail was automatic and inalienable for all crimes not
punishable by death.”).
23. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91; see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951) (“From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, to the present Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, federal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense
shall be admitted to bail.” (citations omitted)).
24. See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 (“This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the
unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to
conviction. . . . Unless this right . . . is preserved, the presumption of innocence . . . would lose its
meaning.”).
25. See generally Hegreness, supra note 22 (arguing that Bail Reform Act, which authorized
detention without bail in certain circumstances, violates a traditional right to bail that should be
understood as fundamental to the American constitutional order).
26. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, title II, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2018)); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987)
(“Responding to ‘the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release, Congress
formulated the Bail Reform Act of 1984 as the solution to a bail crisis in the federal courts.”
(citations omitted)).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); see also Goldkamp, supra note 17, at 41–46 (describing the features
of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, including the detention of defendants deemed to constitute a
danger to the community).
28. This was the “second generation” of bail reform. Goldkamp, supra note 17, at 15–16 (“By
1978, twenty-three states in addition to the District of Columbia had laws addressing defendant
danger as an aspect of bail or pretrial detention decisionmaking. . . . [T]en states revised their laws
through constitutional amendments.”).
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charged with an “extremely serious” federal offense.29 The Court
further noted that the federal regime permitted detention only after
the trial court had found, by clear and convincing evidence adduced
through a full adversary hearing, that an individual defendant
presented a “demonstrable danger” that no lesser intervention could
manage.30 Any detention order is subject to immediate appeal.31 The
Bail Reform Act thus limits detention through a charge-eligibility net
and a strict individual-dangerousness standard, with robust procedural
requirements to minimize the risk of unnecessary detention.32
State preventive detention regimes are similarly circumscribed.
The state constitutions that permit pretrial detention beyond capital
cases also limit detention through either a charge-eligibility net, a
dangerousness standard, or both.33 The Illinois Constitution, for
instance, permits detention only when the charge is a felony offense
that carries a mandatory sentence of incarceration and “release of the
offender would pose a real and present threat to the physical safety of
any person.”34 The Vermont Constitution limits detention eligibility to
charged offenses involving violence where “the court finds, based upon
clear and convincing evidence, that the person’s release poses a
substantial threat of physical violence to any person.”35 Some states
have enacted statutory procedural regimes for detention decisions that
mirror the protections of the federal regime.36 In others, courts have
required such protections as a matter of due process.37
29. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–55 (noting that the Bail Reform Act authorizes detention only
for “extremely serious offenses” and in “carefully limited” circumstances).
30. Id. at 750 (“In a full-blown adversary hearing, the Government must convince a neutral
decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably
assure the safety of the community or any person.” (citation omitted)).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3145.
32. But see Hearing on “The Administration of Bail by State and Federal Courts: A Call for
Reform” Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. of
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (written statement of Alison Siegler, Clinical Professor of Law
and Director of the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic) (reporting that courts do not understand or
adhere to these standards in practice).
33. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.3(b) (4th ed. 2018) (surveying pretrial preventive
detention practice in the states).
34. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
35. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 40(2).
36. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 969.035 (2005).
37. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 5, § 12(3)(b) (“Because shortcomings in this regard [lack
of procedural protections] can lead to the invalidation of preventive detention schemes on federal
due process grounds, state courts are likely to judicially engraft such protections onto the
applicable provisions in the state constitutions, statutes and court rules to forestall such an
event.”).
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Bail practice reflects this legal landscape. The explicit denial of
bail is uncommon. An analysis of state-court data from felony cases in
the nation’s seventy-five largest urban jurisdictions between 1990 and
2004 found that only 6 percent of defendants were detained without
bail.38 The federal system is another story; after decades on the rise, the
detention rate has exceeded 70 percent.39 But the federal system is only
a small sliver of the criminal legal system as a whole,40 the average
federal charge is significantly more serious than the average state
charge, and a sizable proportion of federal charges are unlawful reentry
offenses that courts may perceive to involve heightened flight
concerns.41 At the other end of the spectrum are state misdemeanor
cases, which represent about three-quarters of state-court criminal
caseloads.42 Rates of detention without bail in these cases are
vanishingly low.43
As a whole, then, the law on the books and the practice on the
ground reflect the traditional limits on the outright denial of bail. As
the Supreme Court has affirmed: “In our society liberty is the norm,
and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.”44
B. No Limits on the Functional Denial of Bail
Simultaneously, courts functionally deny bail to significant
proportions of accused people every day. The sequence, by now, is
38. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRETRIAL
RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 2 (2007).
39. Matthew G. Rowland, The Rising Federal Pretrial Detention Rate, in Context, 82 FED.
PROBATION 13, 13 (2018).
40. WENDY SAWYER & PETER WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, MASS
INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 2019 (2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
pie2019.html [https://perma.cc/9HWR-ABWZ].
41. Id. at 13 n.3, 14 fig.3 (showing that in the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2018,
the detention rate for immigration charges was 95 percent); Thomas H. Cohen & Amaryllis
Austin, Examining Federal Pretrial Release Trends over the Last Decade, 82 FED. PROBATION 3,
5–6 fig.1 (reporting federal pretrial detention rate of 53 percent in 2017 after excluding
undocumented residents from dataset and noting that “[i]f illegal aliens were included,” the
detention rate would be 72 percent in 2017).
42. Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV.
731, 746 (2018).
43. Sandra G. Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors By the Numbers, 61 B.C. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 32–33) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3374571 [https://perma.cc/5S8K-JEN2] (reporting, on the basis of case-level court
records from eight jurisdictions, that all misdemeanor defendants were either released without
having to post a secured bond or were assigned a monetary bail amount).
44. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
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familiar. A magistrate makes bail determinations in hurried hearings
with extremely limited information, often just a police report of a few
sentences and the accused person’s criminal record. The magistrate
announces a sum of money, sometimes by consulting a fixed bail
schedule, and moves on to the next case. The accused person does not
have access to that sum of money. The accused person stays in jail.
This routine has led to widespread pretrial detention of the poor.
Between 1990 and 2004, a combined 32 percent of felony defendants in
the nation’s seventy-five largest urban jurisdictions were held until trial
on a secured-bond requirement they presumably could not meet.45 In
some jurisdictions, rates of detention on money bond are even higher,
including for minor offenses. Between 2013 and 2016 in Harris County,
Texas, for instance, 53 percent of misdemeanor defendants were
detained for inability to post bond.46 That rate does not appear to be
anomalous. In Kentucky and Philadelphia during 2013, more than 40
percent of misdemeanor defendants with bail set at only $500 remained
jailed for at least three days; at higher bond amounts, the detention
rates were substantially higher.47 The contemporaneous rate of
misdemeanor pretrial detention on a monetary bond was reportedly
around 25 percent in New York City and 50 percent in Baltimore.48 As
these somewhat random data points suggest, the state of pretrial
release and detention data in state systems is exceedingly poor; the
data mostly range from inaccessible to nonexistent. But what data do
exist suggest that detention on unaffordable bail is a common event
across the nation.
The structural causes of this state of affairs are not mysterious. A
magistrate has powerful incentives to err on the side of caution when
setting release conditions, lest she be held responsible for the release
45. COHEN & REAVES, supra note 38, at 2 tbl.1. The lower rate of detention-on-bond in
felony cases than in the available misdemeanor data, see infra notes 46–48 and accompanying
text, is perhaps a function of the much longer average pretrial period in felony cases; defendants
have much more time to post bail and lack the alternative of pleading guilty for a “time-served”
sentence after a few days or weeks.
46. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 733 (2017). This percentage excludes
defendants held on a probation or other detainer, who were excluded from the sample.
47. Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 43, (manuscript at 34 fig.10).
48. MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, PRETRIAL DETENTION AND
CASE OUTCOMES, PART 1: NONFELONY CASES 13 (2007) (reporting that 25 percent of nonfelony
defendants in New York City are held on bail); Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and the
Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1525 n.81 (2013) (“In New York . . .
25 percent of nonfelony defendants are held on bail. In Baltimore, that number is closer to 50
percent.”).
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of a person who goes on to commit a terrible crime. Conversely, she
has very few incentives to err on the side of maximizing pretrial
liberty.49 Overlaid on this incentive structure is the ease of setting
money bail and the difficulty of adjusting it to defendants’ means.
When money bail results in detention, furthermore, the magistrate who
sets the bail does not necessarily find out. Finally, ever since the rise of
commercial bail bonding, the bail-bond industry has been a powerful
advocate for the use of secured bonds over alternative methods of
release.50 Given these structural conditions, it stands to reason that
absent some check on their discretion, officials charged with pretrial
custody decisions will set unaffordable bail quite regularly. And there
has been no such check. Until the wave of constitutional challenges to
money-bail systems in the last five years, relatively few challenges to
unaffordable bail orders arrived in the appellate courts. When they did,
appellate courts generally deferred to the judgment of the bail-setting
official.
The contradiction is stark. Bail-setting courts have very limited
authority to explicitly deny bail, and they rarely do so. But they have
been given unbounded authority to functionally deny bail by setting it
out of reach. They do it all the time.
II. UNAFFORDABLE BAIL AS DENIAL OF BAIL
There is no contradiction, of course, unless one accepts the
premise that an unaffordable bail condition is the practical and legal
equivalent of a detention order. This Part makes the case for that
premise.
49. See, e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 428–32 (2016)
(explaining bail-setting judges’ incentive to err on the side of detention over release).
50. E.g., COLOR OF CHANGE & ACLU CAMPAIGN FOR SMART JUSTICE, $ELLING OFF OUR
FREEDOM
40
(2017),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/059_bail_
report_2_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D735-K4LQ] (“For-profit bail has used ALEC to promote and
pass at least 12 different model bills to insulate and expand for-profit bail’s role, including four
bills requiring full cash or fully secured bail . . . .”); Michael Hiltzik, Column: Facing Eradication,
the Bail Industry Gears Up to Mislead the Public About Its Value, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2019, 6:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-10-04/hiltzik-bail-industry-eradication
[https://perma.cc/698N-NRK3] (reporting that the bail-bond industry’s trade group, the American
Bail Coalition, claims that a secured bond is “[t]he most effective form of release”); see also
ABCAdmin, Former U.S. Solicitor General Paul Clement To Argue on Behalf of the American
Bail Coalition, Tuesday, May 15, 2018, AM. BAIL COALITION (May 12, 2018),
https://ambailcoalition.org/former-u-s-solicitor-general-paul-clement-argue-behalf-americanbail-coalition-tuesday-may-15-2018 [https://perma.cc/E3VA-KVZH] (“The American Bail
Coalition is the only national bail association that has been involved in all of these critical cases,
devoting significant resources to engage General Clement . . . .”).
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A. The Logical Case
The logical case entails two propositions. The first is that imposing
an unaffordable bail condition is the functional equivalent of denying
bail. Both result in pretrial detention. The second proposition is that
because both orders result in pretrial detention, they should be subject
to equivalent procedures and standards.
The first proposition is straightforward. When a court conditions
a person’s liberty on a money-bail requirement the person cannot
meet, the court has functionally ordered the person detained. Setting
unaffordable bail has the same effect as denying bail. The accused
person remains in jail. She remains in precisely the same facility, under
precisely the same conditions, as a person who has been denied bail
outright. An unaffordable bail order is a de facto order of detention.
The second proposition—that de jure and de facto detention
orders should be subject to equivalent standards—arguably requires
more support. It is not self-evident that all actions with equivalent
effects should be subject to the same standards.51 In this context,
though, the effect of both orders—pretrial detention—warrants
uniform standards and procedures. That is because detention is a
severe deprivation of liberty. In a liberal republic, the deprivation of a
person’s liberty requires robust justification and process.52 Sometimes
detention is justified as punishment pursuant to a lawful conviction.
This is obviously not true in the pretrial arena.53 Pretrial detention can
only be justified on the consequentialist ground that it is necessary to
prevent flight or some other harm.54 This justification structure applies

51. Thanks to the editors of the Duke Law Journal and Sam Wiseman for pressing this point.
52. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty
that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” (citation omitted)); cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment
and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 262–66 (2008) (examining what it means for something to stand
in need of justification).
53. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee
may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”); cf.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–48 (1987) (considering whether pretrial detention
authorized by Bail Reform Act of 1984 “constitutes impermissible punishment before trial” and
holding that it “is regulatory in nature, and [thus] does not constitute punishment before trial in
violation of the Due Process Clause”). See generally Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption
of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723 (2011) (exploring the history of due process protections against
punishment before trial).
54. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51 (explaining that the individual’s fundamental liberty interest
“may, in circumstances where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be
subordinated to the greater needs of society,” and holding that the “careful delineation of the
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equally to all instances of pretrial detention. Detention is just as severe
a deprivation of liberty when a court sets bail out of reach as when it
denies bail outright. Because pretrial detention always requires a
consequentialist justification, every order that imposes pretrial
detention should logically be required to meet the criterion of
necessity, with sufficient process to minimize the risk of error.
To summarize, the logical argument is that: (1) setting bail out of
reach is the functional equivalent of denying bail because it results in
an identical deprivation of liberty; (2) every instance of pretrial
detention stands in equal need of justification; and (3) because of this,
any order that imposes pretrial detention—whether it does so directly
or indirectly via unaffordable bail—should be subject to equally robust
protection against error. The deprivation of pretrial liberty is the fact
that requires a denial of bail to be subject to careful process and limits.
Because unaffordable bail deprives a person of liberty in exactly the
same way, it should be subject to equivalent protections.
B. The Legal Case
Courts have long acknowledged the first proposition of the logical
case: that an unaffordable bail condition is a de facto detention order.55
The most prominent eighteenth-century treatise on bail, written by
Anthony Highmore, noted as much. Highmore defined bail as a
“means of giving liberty to a prisoner and at the same time securing” a

circumstances under which detention will be permitted [in the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984]
satisfies this standard”).
55. For recent recognition of this fact, see, for example, ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d
147, 158 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[W]hen the accused is indigent, setting a secured bail will, in most cases,
have the same effect as a detention order.”); State v. Hill, No. 2018-0637, 2019 WL 6794418, at *5
(N.H. Dec. 13, 2019) (“[D]e facto detention . . . occurs when a trial court sets unaffordable bail
that results in detention.”); Hill v. Hall, No. 3:19-CV-00452, 2019 WL 4928915, at *19 (M.D. Tenn.
Oct. 7, 2019) (“[T]he setting of bail at $150,000, with full knowledge that the defendant would be
unable to post bail in that amount, clearly amounted to a de facto detention order . . . .”); Schultz
v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1358 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (noting that unattainable bail assessments
“serve as de facto detention orders for the indigent”); Weatherspoon v. Oldham, No. 17-CV-2535SHM-cgc, 2018 WL 1053548, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2018) (“[R]equiring money bail as a
condition of release at an amount impossible for the defendant to pay is equivalent to a detention
order.”); In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 513, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (“[R]equiring money
bail as a condition of pretrial release at an amount it is impossible for the defendant to pay is the
functional equivalent of a pretrial detention order.”); State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276, 1292 (N.M.
2014) (“Intentionally setting bail so high as to be unattainable is simply a less honest method of
unlawfully denying bail altogether.”); Commonwealth v. Hamborsky, 75 Pa. D. & C. 4th 505, 521
(Pa. Commonw. Ct. 2005) (“Setting bond at $200,000 would be a charade that would only thinly
disguise the denial of the defendant’s constitutional right to reasonable bail . . . .”).
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defendant’s appearance.56 He further explained that “justices must
take care that, under pretence of demanding sufficient surety, they do
not make so excessive a demand as in effect amounts to a denial of bail;
for this is looked upon as a great grievance.”57 The drafters of the
federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 acknowledged the point, too.58 The
D.C. Circuit Court noted that “[t]he authors of the Act were fully
aware that the setting of bond unreachable because of its amount
would be tantamount to setting no conditions at all.”59
Congress has also acknowledged the second half of the logical
argument: the proposition that de facto and de jure detention orders
should be subject to equivalent procedures and constraints. The Bail
Reform Act of 1984 stipulates, as an initial matter, that “[t]he judicial
officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial
detention of the person.”60 But the drafters acknowledged that a court
might sometimes conclude that no lesser amount, and no less restrictive
alternative, could adequately manage a serious risk of flight.61 In those
circumstances, the Senate Report on the Act explains:
[I]t would appear that there is no available condition of release that
will assure the defendant’s appearance. This is the very finding which,
under section 3142(e), is the basis for an order of detention, and
therefore the judge may proceed with a detention hearing pursuant to
section 3142(f) and order the defendant detained, if appropriate.62

56. A. HIGHMORE, DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINE OF BAIL; IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES vi
(1783); see also id. at 193, 196.
57. Id. at vi.
58. As the Senate Report put it:
There is no doubt . . . that each year thousands of citizens accused of crimes are
confined before their innocence or guilt has been determined by a court of law, not
because there is any substantial doubt that they will appear for trial if released, but
merely because they cannot afford money bail. There is little disagreement that this
system is indefensible.
S. REP. NO. 89-750, at 6 (1965). See also Allen v. United States, 386 F.2d 634, 637 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (quoting and citing the above language).
59. United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2018).
61. Flight is not the only risk at issue in the pretrial phase; the state also has a compelling
interest in protecting the public and preventing witness tampering or obstruction of justice. See,
e.g., id. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (authorizing pretrial release conditions and/or detention if necessary to
“reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required” or protect “the safety of any other
person or the community”). But the federal schema only authorizes the use of monetary bail to
“assure appearance of the person as required,” not to manage other pretrial risks. Id.
§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(xi)–(xii).
62. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 16 (1984) (emphasis added).
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Three federal courts of appeal have affirmed that the Bail Reform
Act requires full detention process when a court wishes to impose
unaffordable bail. In United States v. McConnell, the Fifth Circuit
declined to hold that the Bail Reform Act prohibits unaffordable bail
entirely.63 But the court went out of its way to remind the defendant
that an unaffordable bail order triggers full detention process and that
“the detention hearing is a critical component” of that process.64 The
petitioner in McConnell had not complained about the lack of a
detention hearing in his case, but the opinion implies that he should
have.65 The First and Eighth Circuits have likewise noted that
unaffordable bail triggers full detention process.66 There are ample
grounds to conclude that federal statutory law requires courts to treat
unaffordable bail as the de facto detention order that it is.67
In jurisdictions with less explicit statutory detention regimes,
courts have begun to recognize that unaffordable bail orders are
subject to the same constitutional requirements as transparent orders
of pretrial detention. As the Massachusetts Supreme Court has
explained, because unaffordable bail “is the functional equivalent of
an order for pretrial detention,” it “must be evaluated in light of the
same due process requirements applicable to such a deprivation of
liberty.”68 The California Court of Appeals recently held that “the
[trial] court’s order, by setting bail in an amount it was impossible for

63. United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 108–10 (5th Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 109 n.5.
65. Id.
66. United States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[O]nce a court finds
itself in this situation—insisting on terms in a ‘release’ order that will cause the defendant to be
detained pending trial—it must satisfy the procedural requirements for a valid detention order.”);
United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1482–83 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting that “[t]he
legislative history of the Bail Reform Act particularly addresses the situation” in which a court
concludes that no lesser release condition than unaffordable bail can ensure appearance, and that
in such circumstances the court should hold “a prompt hearing on the issue of detention” (quoting
United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1394 (3d Cir. 1985))).
67. Accord United States v. Clark, No. 1:12-CR-156, 2012 WL 5874483, at *3 (W.D. Mich.
Nov. 20, 2012) (“In short, a finding that a defendant is unable to meet the financial conditions of
a release order serves as a trigger to proceed to make the findings necessary to detain a defendant
pursuant to a detention hearing.”); United States v. Lemos, 876 F. Supp. 58, 61 (D.N.J. 1995)
(“Because the inability to meet a financial condition imposed under subsection (c) [of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142] has the same effect on the defendant as a detention order under subsection (e), courts
have readily extended the analogy to require the same procedural protection subsection (e)
provides.”).
68. Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 963 (Mass. 2017); see also State v. Hill, No.
2018-0637, 2019 WL 6794418, at *7 (N.H. Dec. 13, 2019) (citing Brangan as “setting forth due
process standards that apply when unaffordable bail results in detention”).
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petitioner to pay” without a determination of necessity and robust
procedural safeguards, “effectively constituted a sub rosa detention
order lacking the due process protections constitutionally required to
attend such an order.”69
Caselaw addressing “sub rosa” detention is one thread of this
larger jurisprudence. The term “sub rosa detention” typically refers to
the practice of setting unaffordable bail with the specific intention of
detaining a defendant whom the court lacks authority to detain
outright, or without having to comply with full detention process.70 This
practice has long been pervasive.71 Since the 1960s, appellate courts
have consistently held it to violate state and federal constitutional
law.72 As Justice Douglas once wrote, “It would be unconstitutional to
fix excessive bail to assure that a defendant will not gain his freedom.”73
Regardless of the intention with which it is set, though,
unaffordable bail constitutes a de facto detention order that is subject
to the constitutional criteria for detention. A growing number of

69. In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). The decision is pending
review before the California Supreme Court.
70. E.g., S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 16, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3199 (“The
purpose of this provision [18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2)] is to preclude the sub rosa use of money bond
to detain dangerous defendants.”); Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1489, 1489 (1966) (noting that although the law strictly limits pretrial detention, “courts currently
accomplish such detention sub rosa by setting prohibitively high bail for defendants they consider
dangerous”).
71. See State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 410 P.3d 201, 219 (N.M. 2018) (“It is common
knowledge among judges and others who have worked in our courts that in the vast majority of
cases imposition of high-dollar bonds for any but the most wealthy defendants is an effort to deny
defendants the opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to pretrial release.”); AM. BAR
ASS’N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS 6
(1974) (“[I]t is no secret that many judges, when faced with a defendant whom they fear will
commit ‘additional crimes’ if released, feel compelled to set bail beyond his reach.”).
72. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL & CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT xxix (1965) (“A substantial body of opinion
supports the view that setting high bail to detain dangerous offenders is unconstitutional.”); cf.
Hairston v. United States, 343 F.2d 313, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (“Setting
high bail to deny release discriminate[s] between the dangerous rich and the dangerous poor and
masks the difficult problems of predicting future behavior . . . .” (quotations and citation
omitted)).
73. Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 198 (1960); see also, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S.
1, 5 (1951) (“Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose
[of ensuring the defendant’s appearance] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.” (citing
United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1926))); State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 410 P.3d
201, 219 (N.M. 2018) (“Setting a money bond that a defendant cannot afford to post is a denial of
the constitutional right to be released on bail for those who are not detainable . . . .”); State v.
Brown, 338 P.3d 1276, 1292 (N.M. 2014).





1660

 

   



  

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

   

[Vol. 69:1643

federal and state courts have acknowledged this.74 Detention is no less
oppressive when bail is set out of reach than when bail is denied. And
limits on pretrial detention are pointless if a court can circumvent them
merely by announcing an unattainable bail amount.75
C. Obstacles and Counterarguments
However straightforward the point that unaffordable bail is
tantamount to no bail, few jurisdictions respect this principle in
practice. The courts that have endorsed it remain a small minority.
Perhaps more surprisingly, a few appellate courts have rejected it. This
74. Hill v. Hall, No. 3:19-CV-00452, 2019 WL 4928915, at *19 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 7, 2019)
(acknowledging that “the setting of bail at $150,000, with full knowledge that the defendant would
be unable to post bail in that amount, clearly amounted to a de facto detention order” subject to
due-process criteria for detention but concluding that bail-setting court had complied with those
criteria); Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-04959-YGR, 2019 WL 1017537, at
*16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019) (applying strict scrutiny to equal-protection and due-process
challenge to money-bail schedule “because the fundamental right to liberty is implicated by
plaintiffs’ claims”; granting summary judgment for plaintiffs); Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d
296, 312 (E.D. La. 2018), aff’d on other grounds, 937 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding that due
process requires a panoply of protections before an accused person can be detained on bail,
including representation, meaningful opportunity to be heard, and finding of necessity by clear
and convincing evidence); Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1358, 1366 (N.D. Ala. 2018)
(recognizing that “judges set unattainable bond amounts that serve as de facto detention orders
for the indigent,” and that “[t]he substantive right to pretrial liberty may not be infringed without
‘constitutionally adequate procedures’” (quotations and citations omitted)); Weatherspoon v.
Oldham, No. 17-CV-2535-SHM-cgc, 2018 WL 1053548, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2018) (“When
an indigent arrestee faces the possibility of pretrial detention or its functional equivalent, courts
have held that the minimum process a state must provide is an opportunity to determine whether
no condition or combination of conditions of release could satisfy the purposes of bail . . . .”);
Coleman v. Hennessy, No. 17-CV-06503-EMC, 2018 WL 541091, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018)
(holding that bail-setting court violated due process by “failing to consider whether its bond order
amounted to a de facto order of pretrial detention which would be constitutionally permissible
only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest”); Rodriguez-Ziese v.
Hennessy, No. 17-CV-06473-BLF, 2017 WL 6039705, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017) (holding that
hearing at which trial court imposed unaffordable bail condition “does not withstand the
heightened scrutiny required by Salerno in order to deprive Petitioner of his liberty”); State ex rel.
Torrez, 410 P.3d at 219 (clarifying that pretrial detention must comply with the “new due process
procedures under the New Mexico Constitution”); In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 525–26
(applying strict scrutiny to equal-protection and due-process challenge to money-bail schedules);
Commonwealth v. Hamborsky, 75 Pa. D. & C. 4th 505, 521 (Pa. C.P. Fayette 2005) (reasoning
that “setting bond at $200,000 would be equivalent to denying bail altogether,” which court was
not authorized to do for the offense at issue).
75. Accord United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“Conditions which
are impossible to meet are not to be permitted to serve as devices to thwart the plain purposes of
the [Bail Reform] Act [of 1966], nor are they to serve as a thinly veiled cloak for preventive
detention.”); Brown, 338 P.3d at 1292 (“Neither the New Mexico Constitution nor our rules of
criminal procedure permit a judge to set high bail for the purpose of preventing a defendant’s
pretrial release.”).
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Section considers the jurisprudential and practical obstacles to treating
unaffordable bail as a de facto detention order.
1. Conflicting Case Law. One state appellate court has flatly
rejected the proposition that unaffordable bail must be subject to the
same constraints as a detention order. In State v. Anderson, the
Connecticut Supreme Court held that an unaffordable bond
requirement is not equivalent to a denial of bail for purposes of legal
analysis.76 Anderson concerned an insanity acquittee who was alleged
to have committed a series of assaults in the psychiatric facility where
he was confined, resulting in a felony charge.77 At the state’s request,
the trial court imposed a secured bond requirement of $100,000, which
Anderson could not pay and which resulted in his transfer to a
maximum-security prison.78 The court’s apparent purpose in imposing
the bond was to effectuate this transfer, since Anderson posed an
ostensibly unmanageable threat in the psychiatric facility.79 Anderson
argued that this maneuver violated Connecticut’s constitutional right
to bail, but the Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed.80 It held that
“the defendant was not actually denied bail but, rather, was unable to
post the bail that the trial court, in its discretion, properly set.”81 Thus,
Anderson “was afforded the opportunity for release that
constitutionally was required.”82 The court dismissed the case law that
Anderson had invoked: “Because the trial court set a bond, much of
the authority on which the defendant relies [involving denials of bail]
. . . , is readily distinguishable or otherwise does not support his
claim.”83
Let us be clear about what happened in this case: Anderson had a
right to bail. The trial court lacked authority to detain him. So the court

76. State v. Anderson, 127 A.3d 100, 113 (Conn. 2015).
77. Id. at 107, 105–06.
78. Id. at 106–07.
79. Id. at 125 n.4 (Palmer, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is undisputed that the trial court intentionally
set a bond that far exceeded an amount that the defendant could pay solely to ensure that he
would be incarcerated in advance of trial due to his perceived dangerousness.”).
80. Anderson also argued that it violated procedural due process. The Court held that he
had been afforded adequate process to protect against an erroneous deprivation of liberty. See id.
at 121 (“Prior to the decision that ultimately resulted in his transfer, the defendant had multiple
hearings, was represented by one or more competent counsel at all times and was permitted to
present whatever argument and evidence he believed was pertinent.”).
81. Id. at 113.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 113 n.31.
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imposed an unaffordable bond in order to detain him. And the
Connecticut Supreme Court held that he had not been detained.
In the federal system, only three circuit courts have acknowledged
that an unaffordable bail order triggers full detention process under
the Bail Reform Act.84 Others have simply elided the question. The
Eleventh Circuit, for instance, has written that the question of what
process is due when a court insists on an unaffordable condition of
release “raises a number of difficult questions that we decline to reach
in this case.”85 Perhaps the lack of clarity is due to the fact that until
very recently, defendants who challenged unaffordable bonds typically
claimed a right to release rather than to adequate detention process.86
Very recently, moreover, the Fifth Circuit misconstrued
McConnell by subtly altering a quote from that case in its seminal
opinion addressing Houston’s misdemeanor bail system, ODonnell v.
Harris County.87 The ODonnell court cited McConnell with respect to
the question of what process is due when a court sets unaffordable
bail.88 But it cited McConnell as “concluding that, under the Bail
Reform Act of 1984, the “court must [merely] explain its reasons for
concluding that the particular financial requirement is a necessary part
of the conditions for release” when setting a bond that a detainee
cannot pay.”89
The word “merely,” inserted by ODonnell, renders this quote
inaccurate. In fact, McConnell expressly noted that the court must do
much more than explain its reasons! Having cited the Senate Report’s
clarification that an unaffordable bond requirement triggers full
detention process, the McConnell court dropped a footnote:
“Although McConnell does not complain about the absence of a
formal hearing, we remind that the detention hearing is a critical
component of the Bail Reform Act.”90 The McConnell court proceeded
to quote the full statutory criteria for a detention hearing and a
84. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
85. United States v. Wong-Alvarez, 779 F.2d 583, 585 (11th Cir. 1985).
86. Cf. United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 388–89 (1st Cir. 1985) (rejecting the defendant’s
claim that unaffordable bail violated Bail Reform Act but not addressing whether the magistrate
complied with full detention process); United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1482 (8th Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (same); see also United States v. Lemos, 876 F. Supp. 58, 61 (D.N.J. 1995) (observing
that circuit court opinions addressing appeals of unaffordable bond orders “are unclear as to
whether the defendant had yet been afforded an [sic] full evidentiary hearing”).
87. ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 160 (5th Cir. 2018).
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 110 (5th Cir. 1988)).
90. Id. at 110 n.5.
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detention order, ostensibly to ensure that the defendant was aware of
all the procedure to which he was entitled.91
It is important to note, finally, that although many courts have
paid lip service to the principle that an unaffordable bail condition is
the functional equivalent of no bail, relatively few have actually held
that orders imposing unaffordable bail conditions must be subject to
precisely the same limits and procedures as orders denying bail
outright. Some have, and the list is growing,92 but it is still quite short.
2. Practical Counterarguments. What is going on here? Anderson
invoked semantics to deny reality. ODonnell misrepresented
McConnell by omitting an important qualifer to its holding. Courts wax
eloquent about the right to pretrial freedom and blithely defer to bail
conditions that keep people locked up. Why have the courts failed to
treat unaffordable bail conditions as detention orders?
One possibility is that courts’ reluctance to equate unaffordable
bail with no bail reflects an appreciation of judicial-resource
constraints. It would be a lot of trouble to treat unaffordable bail orders
as detention orders. It would require bail-setting courts to dedicate
considerably more attention to the process than they have been
accustomed to, both in order to determine when a bail condition might
be unaffordable and, if a court still felt inclined to impose it, to comply
with full detention process. The fact that the procedures and criteria
for detention remain opaque in many jurisdictions adds to the
difficulty. This concern with resource constraints is understandable,
but it is not a sound counterargument against the proposition that
functional detention and outright detention warrant equal care.
A second source of resistance to recognizing unaffordable bail as
tantamount to no bail is that it would preclude sub rosa detention.
Approximately twenty state constitutions currently prohibit the denial
of bail outside of extremely serious cases.93 It is an open secret that in
these right-to-bail states, courts use unaffordable bail conditions to
detain people deemed too dangerous or flight prone to release.94 This

91. See id. (setting out the requirements under § 3142(e)–(f) of the Bail Reform Act).
92. See supra notes 68–69, 74 and accompanying text.
93. See supra LAFAVE ET AL., note 5.
94. See, e.g., State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 410 P.3d 201, 219 (N.M. 2018) (“It is common
knowledge among judges and others who have worked in our courts that in the vast majority of
cases imposition of high-dollar bonds for any but the most wealthy defendants is an effort to deny
defendants the opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to pretrial release.”); see also Hill
v. Hall, No. 3:19-cv-00452, 2019 WL 4928915, at *19 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 7, 2019) (“[B]ecause the
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is what happened in Anderson. Anderson posed a threat of violence
that required detention in a maximum-security facility.95 But in
Connecticut, a right-to-bail state, the trial court lacked authority to
order Anderson detained directly. So the court used the only
mechanism available to ensure Anderson’s detention: a bond
requirement patently beyond his ability to meet. Rather than confront
the apparent conflict between the state constitutional right to bail and
the ostensible necessity of detention, the Connecticut Supreme Court
simply held that Anderson had been granted bail. By virtue of having
announced a condition of release—albeit an impossible one—the trial
court had “afforded the opportunity for release that constitutionally
was required.”96
The problems with the Anderson approach are clear. The idea that
an admittedly impossible condition offers an “opportunity” for release
is farcical. For a court to embrace this transparent fiction compromises
the legitimacy of the law.97 The notion that the right to bail is merely a
right to have a court announce some theoretical condition for release,
whether it lies in the realm of possibility or not, also renders the right
to bail entirely empty. After Anderson, the right to bail enshrined in
the Connecticut Constitution is satisfied so long as a court names a
monetary sum before an accused person is carted off to jail. Finally, as
courts have long recognized, sub rosa detention is an inappropriate
method for making the determination to deprive a person of liberty.98
There are other ways for right-to-bail states to address the
occasional necessity of detention. As the dissenting judges in Anderson
wrote, “Our law . . . provides other mechanisms—mechanisms that do
not run afoul of the constitution—that courts may use to protect the
safety of the public when confronted with a potentially violent
defendant.”99 Courts “have the authority to impose nonfinancial
conditions of release and to revoke bail if a defendant fails to comply
Tennessee constitution guarantees a right to bail, the Tennessee courts appear to use unattainable
bail amounts as a proxy for denying bail altogether.”).
95. State v. Anderson, 127 A.3d 100, 107 (Conn. 2015). Why the psychiatric facility was
unable to manage him is a mystery not addressed in the opinion.
96. Id. at 101.
97. The Anderson court, for example, simultaneously blessed the use of an unattainable
bond requirement to detain Anderson and purported to interpret the state constitution as
prohibiting preventive detention. Id. at 113 n.32 (“While preventive detention is permitted in
certain instances in the federal system, I agree that it is not permitted under our state constitution
except in capital cases.”).
98. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
99. Anderson, 127 A.3d at 146 (Palmer, J., dissenting).
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with those conditions.”100 In cases involving mental illness, they can
initiate involuntary civil-commitment procedures specifically designed
to address prospective threats of violence.101 Right-to-bail jurisdictions
can consider amending their state constitutions, as New Jersey and
New Mexico recently have, to authorize preventive detention under
limited circumstances.102 Even without such amendment, there is a case
for interpreting right-to-bail provisions to entail only a conditional
right to release—the condition being the ability of the accused to
provide a sufficient guarantee of her appearance and good behavior.
On this interpretation, a court may deny bail when the state has
adequately demonstrated that no surety is “sufficient.”103
The need to manage acute threats thus does not require—and
does not justify—willful blindness to the reality that unaffordable bail
is a functional denial of bail. The fact that equating unaffordable bail
with a denial of bail precludes sub rosa detention is a reason to
recognize the equivalence, not an argument against it.
3. The Conceptual Counterargument. The more principled
argument against treating unaffordable bail as tantamount to no bail is
that they are not the same because unaffordable bail does not make
release impossible. It only makes it difficult. A bail condition may be
unaffordable in the sense of inflicting economic hardship and yet not

100. Id.; see also State v. Ayala, 610 A.2d 1162, 1171 (Conn. 1992) (holding that “the power
to enforce reasonable conditions of release [by revocation of release] is a necessary component
of a trial court’s jurisdiction over a criminal case” and surveying broad authority in other
jurisdictions supporting that proposition). The Anderson dissent further noted: “Indeed, it
appears that the trial court in the present case, following the appropriate procedures, could have
revoked the defendant’s bail for his commission of a crime in violation of the conditions of his
release.” Anderson, 127 A.3d at 146 (Palmer, J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., 56 C.J.S. MENTAL HEALTH § 46 (“Individuals are subject
to involuntary civil commitment for mental illness or mental disorder if they pose a danger to
others, the public, or society.” (footnotes omitted)).
102. N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶11 (amended 2017); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 (amended 2016).
103. The Connecticut right-to-bail provision, like most others, guarantees the right “to be
released on bail upon sufficient security” in noncapital cases. CONN. CONST. art. I § 8. The
argument would be that the right to release on bail is contingent on the existence of a sufficient
security. There is support in the history of the Connecticut right to bail to support this
interpretation. See, e.g., Ayala, 610 A.2d at 1172 (reporting that the right “is traceable to a 1672
legislative enactment declaring that ‘no mans person shall be Restrained or Imprisoned by any
Authority whatsoever, before the Law hath sentenced him thereunto if he can put in sufficient
security, bayl or mainprize for his appearance and good behaviour in the mean time . . . .’”
(emphasis added)). On the other hand, other historical evidence suggests that the right to bail was
indeed understood as a right to release. See, e.g., HIGHMORE, supra note 56 and accompanying
text.
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factually impossible for the accused person to meet. In other words, it
might be unaffordable but still technically attainable.
Consider the frequent scenario in which an accused person has no
income or assets herself but does have relatives who might be willing
to contribute toward her bail. If the bail-setting court imposes a
secured bond of $500 as a condition of release, the condition is
unaffordable for her, but it may not be unattainable. If her relatives
come up with the money, it will not keep her in jail.
This scenario highlights the complexity of “unaffordability.”
When is a bail condition unaffordable? The question requires two
kinds of judgment. It requires, first, a factual assessment of the
resources available to a person. Does she have income? Assets?
Liabilities or debts? Indirect access to resources through other people?
These questions have objective answers, although they may not be easy
to establish.104 Secondly, though, a determination of affordability
requires a moral assessment about what a person should be willing to
do, or forego, in order to pay the sum in question. Should she be
expected to draw on the resources of friends and family? To substitute
current assets—for instance, by pawning a watch, selling a car, or
mortgaging a home? To forego paying rent or a child’s tuition? To sell
her blood or organs?105 There is a long continuum from a sum a person
can procure instantly and painlessly to one that she could not possibly
procure under any circumstances. The point along that spectrum where
a financial condition becomes unaffordable is a moral judgment, not an
empirical fact.
One should therefore concede that there are real differences
between an unaffordable bail condition and an outright denial of bail.
When a court has denied bail, there is no action the accused could take
to procure her lawful release on bail. When a court has imposed an
unaffordable condition, by contrast, there may be some action the
accused—or a third party—could theoretically take to procure her
lawful release on bail. The denial of bail is categorically final in a way

104. It is difficult to obtain an accurate accounting of an accused person’s financial situation.
Time is limited and arrestees may not be reliable reporters.
105. Cf. Campbell Robertson, For Offenders Who Can’t Pay, It’s a Pint of Blood or Jail Time,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/us/for-offenders-who-cant-payits-a-pint-of-blood-or-jail-time.html [https://perma.cc/KR3M-YTHW] (citing examples of courts
ordering those defendants subject to fines for minor offenses who were unable to pay to give
blood or face jail time in lieu of payment).
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that unaffordable bail is not.106 And whereas it is easy to determine
objectively when a court has denied bail, it is impossible to determine
objectively when bail becomes unaffordable.
Yet these differences do not negate the proposition that
unaffordable bail is the functional equivalent of a detention order. First
of all, we can determine when bail is unaffordable. Courts and agencies
conduct ability-to-pay assessments all the time, in contexts that include
appointment of counsel, imposition of fines and fees,107 the evaluation
of in forma pauperis filings,108 and applications for all forms of public
benefits. The most straightforward procedure is for the court to ask a
defendant: “Can you post a two-hundred-dollar deposit by
tomorrow?”109 The slightly more involved model is a short
questionnaire that asks a person to list her income, assets, dependents,
routine financial outlays, and debts.110 Some jurisdictions use
questioning under oath to assess a person’s resources. A number of
jurisdictions and organizations have developed model ability-to-pay

106. In addition to the possibility that the accused or her family might scrape together the
funds to post bail, in some jurisdictions and circumstances there might be a possibility that a bail
fund or other group of concerned citizens might ultimately post the bail. Jocelyn Simonson, Bail
Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 599–600 (2017).
107. See Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability To Pay, 103
IOWA L. REV. 53, 59 (2017) (arguing that “the development of a meaningful system for graduating
economic sanctions according to ability to pay is both feasible and desirable,” drawing on dayfine models used in past). See generally NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES & BAIL PRACTICES,
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES AND THE CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS,
LAWFUL COLLECTION OF LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS: A BENCH CARD FOR JUDGES
(2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Images/Topics/Fines%20Fees/BenchCard_FINAL_Feb2_2017.
ashx [perma.cc/E2BB-LJWW] (offering guidance around ability-to-pay determinations).
108. See, e.g., Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. 1478
(2019) (empirical study of in forma pauperis pleadings in federal court); AO 239: Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form), U.S. COURTS (revised
Jan. 2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao239_1.pdf [perma.cc/WG7P-VHRZ];
AO 240: Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Short Form),
U.S. COURTS (2010), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao240_0.pdf [perma.cc/8Z4YYQS4].
109. This approach has the virtue of avoiding the “invasive inquiry” and risk of implicit bias
that more involved ability-to-pay determinations entail. See Theresa Zhen, (Color)blind Reform:
How Ability-to-Pay Determinations Are Inadequate To Transform A Racialized System of Penal
Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 175, 201 (2019).
110. One Georgia county, for instance, uses a one-page form that asks, in simple language, if
a person is married, supports children, and has sources of income. Bond Hearing Financial
Worksheet (on file with author). For another example, see Affidavit of Financial Hardship for Bail
Determination in Misdemeanor Arrest Cases developed and implemented as part of a consent
decree in Glynn County, Georgia. Affidavit of Financial Hardship for Bail Determination in
Misdemeanor Arrest Cases, https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/mock-et-al-v-glynn-county-etal-financial-status-affidavit-bond-determination-order [https://perma.cc/MC2V-2GRE].
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forms or processes for the sentencing context that might be adapted for
bail inquiries.111
Every ability-to-pay regime entails a moral determination about
what people should be expected to pay, given their resources, although
that determination is usually implicit. For appointment-of-counsel
purposes, for instance, it is the rule in many jurisdictions that a person
who receives any public benefits qualifies as “indigent” and is entitled
to public counsel.112 The rationale for that rule is not that it is factually
impossible for every person—or even most people—who receive
public benefits to hire private counsel. The rationale is that it is
impossible for some and would impose undue hardship for most of the
rest, which is to say that it would impose a financial strain that we
should not ask people to take on.
Every pretrial system likewise needs a mechanism for assessing
ability-to-pay that includes both a factual inquiry into a person’s
resources and a moral determination about what, given a particular
level of wealth, a person should be expected to pay toward bail. This
moral determination is difficult, but it is also unavoidable. A society
that values human agency and dignity cannot condition liberty on a
person’s willingness to sell his organs or forego paying rent. Detention
that is “chosen” over posting a bond that would put a family on the
streets is not chosen in any meaningful sense. There is a threshold
beyond which a payment is functionally impossible to make, if not
factually impossible.113 A bail condition is unaffordable, in other words,
111. Increasingly, the process is digital. See generally Meghan O’Neil & J.J. Prescott,
Targeting Poverty in the Courts: Improving the Measurement of Ability To Pay, 82 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (2019). For paper models, see, for example, SHARON BRETT & MITALI
NAGRECHA, HARVARD LAW SCH. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, PROPORTIONATE
FINANCIAL SANCTIONS: POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR JUDICIAL REFORM vi (2019),
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Proportionate-Financial-Sanctions_layout_FINAL.pdf
[perma.cc/UJ3P-2SJT] (providing table of contents summary of recommendations), HARVARD
LAW SCH. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A
GUIDE FOR POLICY REFORM 26–32 (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Confronting-CrimJustice-Debt-Guide-to-Policy-Reform-FINAL.pdf
[perma.cc/H8DJ-6NTZ],
and
MECKLENBURG COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, BENCH CARD: IMPOSITION OF FINES, COSTS, FEES,
AND RESTITUTION 1–2 (2017), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2018/11/
Mecklenburg-Final-Imposition-Bench-Card-10.16.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GZF-2EK8].
112. Zhen, supra note 109, at 203 (reporting, on the basis of a fifty-state survey of indigency
standards, that “the majority of statutes contained a presumption of indigency if the defendant
receives public assistance”).
113. Cf. Beth A. Colgan & Nicholas M. McLean, Financial Hardship and the Excessive Fines
Clause: Assessing the Severity of Property Forfeitures After Timbs, 129 YALE L.J. F. 430, 449
(2020) (proposing a test for assessing the severity of forfeitures that is “sensitive” to their “realworld effects”).
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if the accused person either cannot pay it or should not be expected to.
We can determine where this threshold lies because we decide where
it lies, just as we have done in other contexts.114
Beyond that threshold, a bail condition is the functional
equivalent of a detention order. Either there is no action the accused
person can lawfully take to obtain release because the bail amount is
patently out of reach, or there is no reasonable action the accused can
take to obtain release. In either case, detention is the expected—
indeed, the appropriate—result of the court order imposing the
condition. When detention is the expected and appropriate result of a
court order, that order is a de facto detention order.115
Lastly, if there is any ambiguity about whether a bail condition is
affordable or not, the system provides a good heuristic: if a financial
condition is the only thing keeping a person in jail, it is probably
unaffordable. When a person is still in jail forty-eight hours after the
first opportunity to post bond, it is a good indication that the person
cannot post it. Jail is a very bad place to be.116 People do not choose to
stay there lightly.117 Even if courts cannot always identify the threshold
114. I do not mean to understate how fraught this decision is. The difficulty of determining
what bail is “affordable,” and the risk that ability-to-pay frameworks will exacerbate structural
inequality, is a powerful argument for ending reliance on money bail altogether. See generally
Beth A. Colgan, Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions and Structural Reform, 69 DUKE L.J.
1529 (2020) (“[G]raduation [of economic sanctions] as reform is incomplete and perhaps even
dangerous if divorced from broader efforts at structural transformation.”); Zhen, supra note 109,
at 184–87 (explaining how ability-to-pay frameworks can exacerbate structural inequality).
115. This principle also answers the argument that unaffordable bail lacks the finality of a bail
denial because a third party, including a bail fund, might post a bail amount that is unaffordable
to the accused. Unaffordable bail does lack the finality of a denial of bail. And finality is relevant
to the protections required for a deprivation of liberty, here as in other contexts. Cf. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (recognizing that the death penalty “is unique in its severity and
irrevocability” and thus requires special protections). But finality, like unaffordability, is a
spectrum. At some point along that spectrum, the possibility of release becomes more theoretical
than real. Cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 (2010), modified (July 6, 2010) (observing
that a life-without-parole sentence “deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving
hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which does
not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”).
116. See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, &
the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1297 (2012) (describing the “often
horrifying” conditions in jails).
117. See Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Blackstone Ratio for Preventive Detention
(May 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (reporting that the average
Mechanical Turk survey participant “would rather be robbed than spend five days in jail, rather
be burglarized than go to jail for more than a week, rather be seriously assaulted than be jailed
for any more than a month”). The one possible exception are homeless individuals. In
jurisdictions with cold weather and without adequate shelter capacity for the homeless
population, desperate people may prefer jail—“two hots and a cot”—to the streets.
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of unaffordability at the outset, they should be able to identify bail
conditions that do in fact detain.
III. TREATING UNAFFORDABLE BAIL AS A DETENTION ORDER
Treating unaffordable bail as a detention order simply means that
a bail-setting court contemplating a financial condition of release must
ensure that the defendant can meet it without undue hardship. If not,
and the court nonetheless believes that the condition is necessary, it
must proceed with whatever process and fact finding is required to
authorize pretrial detention. If a court imposes a financial condition
that results in detention without having complied with full detention
process, the accused should be entitled to a prompt detention hearing.
Appellate courts should zealously ensure that judicial officers charged
with regulating pretrial release fully comply with detention criteria.
This is essentially the federal schema, at least on paper. Federal
statutory law directs the judicial officer charged with bail
determinations to release an accused person on recognizance or an
unsecured bond “unless the judicial officer determines that such
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the
community,” in which case the officer must release the person subject
to the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions that will
reasonably assure appearance and protect public safety.118 If such
conditions are not adequate, the court must hold a detention hearing
at which the accused has the right to counsel and the right to present
and interrogate evidence.119 The court may order detention only if it
finds by clear and convincing evidence that no lesser intervention will
suffice.120 The law stipulates that “[t]he judicial officer may not impose
a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the
person.”121 As the Senate Report explains, if the judicial officer feels
that such a condition is necessary, then “it would appear that there is
no available condition of release that will assure the defendant’s
appearance,” and the judicial officer should “proceed with a detention
hearing pursuant to section 3142(f) and order the defendant detained,
if appropriate.”122
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

18 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2018); id. § 1342(a), (c)(1).
Id. § 3142(f).
Id. § 3142(e).
Id. § 3142(c)(2).
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 16 (1983).
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It is not clear, however, that federal practice adheres to this
procedure. As noted above, appellate opinions addressing challenges
to unaffordable bail conditions imposed by federal courts suggest that
such conditions may be imposed fairly regularly.123 As also noted,
neither the federal statute nor current case law clearly establishes that
detaining a person on an unaffordable condition requires full detention
process. The federal scheme thus falls short in failing to explicitly
address the scenario in which a court violates the prohibition on
unaffordable bail and imposes a condition that results in detention.124
Two new model bail statutes aspire to more directly require that
unaffordable bail conditions be treated as de facto detention orders.
The first is a “Model Bill for Pretrial Procedures” drafted by the
Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School (“CJPP”).125
The second is the Pretrial Release and Detention Act under
development by the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”).126 These are
not the only pretrial models in circulation, but the others either
prohibit money bail entirely or prohibit unaffordable bail without
addressing situations where it is nonetheless imposed.127
123. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
124. This is not what advocates for federal pretrial reform identify as the most serious
problem in the federal pretrial system, however. The most serious problem is that “the federal
system detains people at an astronomical rate,” mostly through the explicit detention procedures.
Hearing on “The Administration of Bail by State and Federal Courts: A Call for Reform” Before
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary,
116th Cong. 1 (2019) (testimony of Alison Siegler, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the
Federal Criminal Justice Clinic).
125. HARVARD LAW SCH. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE
FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 28–32 (2019), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/
BailReform_WEB.pdf [perma.cc/3W5B-8LL5].
126. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION
ONLY: ALTERNATIVES TO BAIL ACT [PROPOSED NEW NAME: PRETRIAL RELEASE AND
DETENTION ACT] (2020) [hereinafter ULC Draft], https://www.uniformlaws.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=55561562-444e-62704a9f-3c67344d64d8&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/S4PG-LZD9]. As noted above, the author
is the Associate Reporter for the ULC Alternatives to Bail Committee.
127. See AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 71,
at 58–61 (including provisions in § 5.3 “Release on money bail” explaining that money should be
used only to assure appearance and should not result in detention, but not addressing situations
where it does); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A New VISION FOR PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 5 (2019), https://www.aclu.org/report/new-vision-pretrial-justice-united-states
[perma.cc/ME4M-WKLV] (prohibiting unaffordable bail but not addressing situation where a
court nonetheless imposes it); CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS, PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION ACT
§ 2, https://cdn.buttercms.com/1ted5IrSx2ynPT8kitB5 [perma.cc/47PA-MADD] (prohibiting
secured financial conditions altogether); SCHNACKE, MODEL BAIL LAWS, supra note 18, at 199
(advising jurisdictions to eliminate “all financial conditions at bail, including amounts on
warrants”).
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The CJPP Bill bifurcates pretrial process between those arrestees
who can be immediately released on recognizance and those for whom
some form of intervention with pretrial liberty may be warranted. For
an arrestee in the latter group, the court must hold a “detention and
conditional release hearing” at which the accused has the right to
representation and to present and interrogate evidence.128 The court
may impose a restriction on liberty only if “the court finds clear and
convincing evidence that no less restrictive conditions would
reasonably assure” the defendant’s future appearance, public safety,
and the integrity of the criminal proceeding.129 The model act prohibits
unaffordable bail but anticipates that some court might nonetheless
impose it. To address this scenario, it provides that “[i]f, 24 hours after
the imposition of money bail, a defendant continues to be detained,
that defendant is entitled to a detention and conditional release
hearing.”130
The ULC Act bifurcates pretrial process differently, requiring a
full adversarial hearing only for detention, but it likewise includes
provisions to ensure that unaffordable bail is treated as a denial of bail.
Like the CJPP Bill, the ULC Act prohibits unaffordable bail.
Anticipating that it might nonetheless be imposed, it provides that if a
person ordered conditionally released remains in jail, the court must
hold a full adversarial detention hearing “not later than [72] hours
after” the proceeding at which the condition was imposed, with a
possible good-cause continuance for another [72] hours.131 The Act
subjects such presumptively unaffordable conditions to the same
standard as a denial of bail: “The court may not order pretrial
detention or continue a condition of release that results in detention
unless [the individual is charged with a detention-eligible offense and]
the court determines by clear and convincing evidence,” after the
adversary hearing, that the criteria for detention are met.132
No existing pretrial regime includes a mechanism to ensure that
an unaffordable bail condition is subject to exactly the same process

128. HARVARD LAW SCH. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 125, at 28.
129. Id. at 30.
130. Id. at 31.
131. ULC Draft, supra note 126, § 401. Section 402 of the draft notes that at the detention
hearing, the defendant has the right to testify, to present and cross-examine witnesses, to review
evidence to be introduced by the government, to present evidence, to provide information and to
be represented by counsel. Id. § 402.
132. Id. § 403(b) (emphasis added).
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and standards as a denial of bail.133 Two jurisdictions often cited as
pretrial models, New Jersey and the District of Columbia, fall notably
short. The regime that comes the closest is the new framework of
statutory and court rules in New Mexico, but even this does not enforce
the equivalence completely.
New Jersey undertook wholesale pretrial reform in 2014,
including by amending its state constitution, and the results have been
promising. Detention rates have plummeted, courts have almost
entirely foregone financial conditions, and pretrial rearrest and
appearance rates have remained steady.134 New Jersey’s new bail
statute, though, does not address the scenario in which a court imposes
unaffordable bail, except to subject such cases to the speedy-trial limits
for people ordered detained.135 This omission does not pose a problem
so long as New Jersey judges continue to eschew financial conditions,
but should the culture shift, it could present a significant problem in
future.
The D.C. bail statute does make some effort to address the
scenario where a court imposes unaffordable bail but does not treat it
as the equivalent of a detention order. As an initial matter, the D.C.
statute, like the federal one, prohibits financial conditions that “result
in the preventive detention of the person,” except if the court complies
with full detention process.136 The statute then provides that a person
who remains detained on a condition of release 24 hours after the
release hearing “shall upon application be entitled to have the
conditions reviewed by the judicial officer who imposed them.”137
Unless that review results in release, “the judicial officer shall set forth
in writing the reasons for requiring the conditions imposed.”138 The
statute thus offers some recognition that de facto detention by
unaffordable bail requires additional justification. But it does not
require the court to comply with the adversarial hearing and finding of

133. At least, my research has disclosed none.
134. CHLOE ANDERSON, CINDY REDCROSS, ERIN VALENTINE & LUKE MIRATRIX, MDRC
CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, EVALUATION OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
REFORMS THAT USE THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: EFFECTS OF NEW JERSEY’S CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM 32–33 (2019); N.J. JUDICIARY, 2017 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE 19 (2018).
135. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c)(2), (d)(2) (2019).
136. D.C. CODE § 23-1321(c)(3) (2019).
137. Id. § 23-1321(c)(4).
138. Id.
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necessity by clear and convincing evidence that it requires for
detention.
New Mexico’s new bail regime comes the closest to subjecting
unaffordable bail orders to the same process and standards as a denial
of bail. New Mexico undertook comprehensive bail reform in 2016 and
2017, including a constitutional amendment and new statutory rules
governing pretrial release and detention decisions. The new
constitutional provision authorizes pretrial detention “for a defendant
charged with a felony if the prosecuting authority requests a hearing
and proves by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions
will reasonably protect the safety of any other person or the
community.”139 New statutory rules guarantee the accused the right to
representation and to present and interrogate evidence at this
detention hearing.140 They also provide a right to immediate appeal of
any detention order and speedy-trial limits for cases in which the
accused is detained.141
The New Mexico Supreme Court has been very clear that courts
may not circumvent these detention procedures by setting
unaffordable bail conditions, and both the state constitution and the
new statutory framework strive to codify that principle. The New
Mexico Constitution stipulates that an accused person “shall not be
detained solely because of financial inability to post a money or
property bond.”142 The statute provides that if a defendant remains in
custody twenty-four hours after an order imposing conditions of
release “as a result of the defendant’s inability” to meet them, “the
defendant shall, on motion of the defendant or the court’s own motion,
be entitled to a hearing to review the conditions of release.”143 The

139. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 (amended 2016). The amendment further provides that “[a]n
appeal from an order denying bail shall be given preference over all other matters.” Id.
140. N.M. R. CIV. P. DIST. CT. 5-409(F)(3).
141. Id.
142. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 (amended 2016). This is actually a simplification. The full
relevant portion of the constitutional provision reads:
A person who is not detainable on grounds of dangerousness nor a flight risk in the
absence of bond and is otherwise eligible for bail shall not be detained solely because
of financial inability to post a money or property bond. A defendant who is neither a
danger nor a flight risk and who has a financial inability to post a money or property
bond may file a motion with the court requesting relief from the requirement to post
bond. The court shall rule on the motion in an expedited manner.
Id. The meaning of the qualifiers “who is not detainable on grounds of dangerousness nor a flight
risk in the absence of bond” and “who is neither a danger nor a flight risk” is not entirely clear.
Id.
143. N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5-401(H)(1).





2020]

 

   



  

DETENTION BY ANY OTHER NAME

   

1675

court must hold the review hearing within five days.144 The accused has
the right to representation.145 The court must amend the condition to
ensure release unless it determines by clear and convincing evidence
that the condition “is reasonably necessary” to ensure the defendant’s
appearance, and explains its reasoning on the record.146
Much of the credit for this schema goes to the New Mexico
Supreme Court. Between 2014 and 2018, former Chief Justice Charles
Daniels authored a series of opinions that set the stage for bail reform
in New Mexico and then sought to clarify and enforce the new rules in
place.147 In the final such opinion he authored before his death in 2019,
Chief Justice Daniels wrote:
In both the Salas and Harper detention orders the district court
denied pretrial detention and then conditioned release on posting
$100,000 bonds. Money bonds are not light substitutes for principled
pretrial detention. . . . Setting a money bond that a defendant cannot
afford to post is a denial of the constitutional right to be released on
bail for those who are not detainable for dangerousness in the new
due process procedures under the New Mexico Constitution.148

The New Mexico Supreme Court has done a great deal to curtail sub
rosa detention on unaffordable bail, whether the detention is
intentional or inadvertent, as has the new constitutional and statutory
regime.
Yet even the regimes that come closest to treating unaffordable
bail conditions as detention orders—the New Mexico regime and the
CJPP and ULC models—do not do as much as they could to
accomplish the goal. The New Mexico regime places the burden of
initiating review of an unaffordable condition on the defendant, and
potentially the burden of proof at the review hearing to show that the
condition is unaffordable.149 The review hearing does not appear to
include the full set of procedures and protections as a detention

144. N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5-401(H)(2).
145. Id.
146. Id. The court must also “file written findings of the individualized facts justifying the
secured bond as soon as possible, but no later than two (2) days after the conclusion of the
hearing.” Id.
147. See generally State v. Groves, 410 P.3d 193 (N.M. 2018); State v. Ameer, No. S-1-SC36395, 2018 WL 1904680 (N.M. 2018); State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 410 P.3d 201 (N.M. 2018);
State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276 (N.M. 2014).
148. Whitaker, 410 P.3d at 219.
149. The court rule does not specify who bears the burden of proof. N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST.
CT. 5-401(H)(2).
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hearing.150 All three of these regimes, moreover, lack a real
enforcement mechanism. An accused person who remains jailed on a
secured-bond condition may be entitled to a review or detention
hearing, but what happens if a court does not hold it? One option, for
those designing new bail regimes, might be to provide for automatic
release if the detention hearing is not held within a certain timespan.
Setting that default might provide an adequate incentive for courts to
comply with detention process.
IV. WHAT STANDARDS FOR DETENTION?
The proposition that unaffordable bail conditions must be subject
to the same process and standards as a detention order foregrounds a
question that lies at the core of all bail reform debates: What are the
substantive and procedural criteria for pretrial detention? This Article
cannot begin to answer that question, but it can offer a brief overview
of the state of the law.
In jurisdictions that already have an explicit pretrial detention
regime, the standards for detention are relatively clear. “At least
twenty-two states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system
already authorize the use of pretrial preventive detention in some
circumstances.”151 Several of these jurisdictions have a statutory
framework governing detention process in some detail.152 Statutory
requirements for detention vary among them, but there is a core of
uniformity. Most authorize pretrial detention only upon a judicial

150. At a review hearing, an accused person is entitled to representation and to written
findings of fact if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that an unaffordable
bond is necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance, which is the only basis on which the court
is permitted to continue an unaffordable bond. But it does not appear that an accused person has
the full panoply of discovery rights and rights to present, compel, and interrogate evidence as in
a detention hearing. Compare N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5-401(H)(2), with N.M. R. CRIM. P.
DIST. CT. 5-409.
151. HARVARD LAW SCH. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, MOVING BEYOND
MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 25 (2016); see also Pretrial Release Eligibility, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-andcriminal-justice/pretrial-release-eligibility.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q3M2-KYC7] (cataloging state
constitutions and statutes stipulating “when pretrial release may be denied” as of 2013); Pretrial
(July
7,
2013),
Detention,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-detention.aspx [https://perma.cc/JEU5XJW6] (cataloguing “limits on pretrial detention” in state constitutions and statutes as of 2013).
152. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2018); D.C. CODE § 23-1322 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 907.041
(2019); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.132 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 58A (Lexis 2019); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-18 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. § 969.035 (2019); N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5409.
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finding by clear and convincing evidence that no less restrictive
alternative is adequate to meet a compelling state interest.153 Nearly all
require a full adversarial hearing before detention can be imposed.154
Because many jurisdictions do not have such a regime in place,
though, and because there is no guarantee that existing statutes comply
with constitutional standards, the foundational question is what
constraints the federal Constitution and state constitutions place on
pretrial detention. This question is the subject of ongoing debate.
Courts are wrestling with it across the country as this Article goes to
print.
Courts and litigants have recently advanced two competing views
of federal constitutional criteria for pretrial detention. We can call the
first the “robust-constraints view.” On this view, because physical
liberty is a fundamental right—no less so when a person stands accused
of crime—substantive due process requires that any detention be
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest, and procedural due
process requires the state to bear the burden of proving necessity by
clear and convincing evidence in an adversarial hearing.155 We can call
the opposing view the “minimal-constraints view.” On this view,
probable cause is sufficient to authorize detention through
adjudication, and the state grants pretrial release wholly at its
discretion. Due process jurisprudence is inapposite because more

153.
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1), (f); D.C. CODE § 23-1322 (b)(1), (d); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 276, § 58A(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-18(a)(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-19 (e)(2),
(3); N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5-409(a), (f)(4); WIS. STAT. § 969.035(5), (6)(b); see also FLA.
STAT. § 907.041 (providing that “[t]he court may order pretrial detention if it finds a substantial
probability” that any of certain enumerated circumstances exist, including circumstances
indicating “that no condition of release will reasonably prevent the obstruction of the judicial
process,” “assure the defendant’s appearance,” or “protect the community from risk of physical
harm to persons”); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.132 (“The state attorney has the burden of showing beyond
a reasonable doubt the need for pretrial detention pursuant to the criteria in section 907.041,
Florida Statutes.”).
154. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1), (f); D.C. CODE § 23-1322 (b)(1), (d); FLA. STAT. §
907.041(h); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 58A(4); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-19 (e)(1); WIS.
STAT. § 969.035(6)(c); N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5-409(f)(2), (3).
155. See, e.g., Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-04959-YGR, 2019 WL
1017537, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019); Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 312 (E.D. La.
2018), aff’d on other grounds, 937 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 2019); In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513,
517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); Brief for the Nat’l Law Professors of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure,
and Constitutional Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 15–16, Humphrey, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 513; cf. Whitaker, 410 P.3d at 219 (clarifying that pretrial detention must comply with the
“new due process procedures under the New Mexico Constitution,” which include proof of
necessity by clear and convincing evidence).
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specific constitutional provisions—the Fourth Amendment and
Excessive Bail Clause—alone govern pretrial custody.156
The federal court system has yet to resolve the conflict between
these opposing views. There is no Supreme Court jurisprudence that
explicitly precludes or rejects the minimal-constraints view. Adherents
of the robust-constraints view reply that United States v. Salerno,157 in
which the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the
federal pretrial detention regime, clearly presumed that probable
cause is not sufficient to authorize detention until adjudication. If it
were, Salerno would have been an easy case! There would have been
no need for the due process and Excessive Bail Clause analyses that
the Court undertook. At a structural level, interpreting the
Constitution to permit pretrial detention solely on the basis of
probable cause would eviscerate other protections for the liberty of the
accused, including the presumption of innocence.158 History also
supports the fundamental right to pretrial liberty.159 Due process
doctrine is apposite because liberty is at issue, but even if the Fourth
Amendment and Excessive Bail Clause exclusively govern pretrial
custody, they should be understood to entail the same requirements as
due process would.
As bail litigation percolates in the federal courts, a consensus may
be emerging. Given that physical liberty “lies at the heart of the liberty
that [the Due Process] Clause protects,”160 courts have generally
agreed that pretrial detention requires a finding of necessity and robust
process. They have diverged, however, with respect to what that

156. See, e.g., Fourteen Judges’ Combined Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ODonnell v. Harris County, No. 4:16-cv-01414,
24–52 (S.D.Tex. July 6, 2018); Brief for Amici Curiae American Bail Coalition and Georgia Ass’n
of Professional Bondsmen in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Reversal of the Preliminary
Injunction, Hester v. Gentry, No. 18-13894, 2018 WL 6735059 (11th Cir. 2019); Brief of Appellants
Fourteen Judges of Harris County Criminal Courts at Law, ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d
147 (5th Cir. 2018); Brief for American Bail Coalition et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendant-Appellant and Reversal of the Preliminary Injunction, Walker v. City of Calhoun, No.
16-10521, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1446 (2019).
157. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
158. Accord Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“Unless this right to bail before trial is
preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its
meaning.”).
159. See ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1068–85 (S.D. Tex. 2017)
(chronicling the historical development of bail), aff’d as modified, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018);
see also SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL, supra note 21, at 19–40 (chronicling a history of
the practice); Hegreness, supra note 22, at 912.
160. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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process must include. Some have held it to require a full adversarial
hearing, a finding of necessity by clear and convincing evidence, and
written reasoning.161 Others have held that a finding of necessity by a
preponderance of the evidence will suffice, and a court need not
commit its findings to writing.162 Still others have declined to take a
position on the appropriate burden of proof.163
State constitutional law adds another layer of complexity. As
discussed above, a majority of state constitutions enshrine a right to
bail with limited exceptions, for either capital cases only or capital
cases and certain other serious felonies. If understood to entail a right
to release, these provisions also prohibit unaffordable bail outside of
the detention “eligibility net.” The hard question is whether the right
to be “bailable by sufficient sureties” does entail a right to release.
Does it presume that some available surety is sufficient? Or is the right
to be “bailable by sufficient sureties” a right to release conditional on
the availability of a sufficient surety, such that the state may order
detention if no surety can adequately ensure appearance and protect
safety?164
Answering these questions is the central challenge now facing the
bail-reform movement. Recognizing that unaffordable bail is a de facto
detention order does not itself shed any light on when it is appropriate
and lawful to keep a person in a cell. But it does put that question front
and center, which is where it belongs.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to lay out the argument that an order
imposing unaffordable bail is an order of pretrial detention and must
be treated as such. This argument has become increasingly prominent
161. See, e.g., Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 15-cv-04959-YGR, 2019 WL
1017537, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019); Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 312 (E.D. La.
2018), aff’d on other grounds, 937 F.3d 525 (5th Cir. 2019); In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513,
517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
162. See, e.g., Hill v. Hall, No. 3:19-cv-00452, 2019 WL 4928915, at *17 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 7,
2019); Weatherspoon v. Oldham, No. 17-cv-2535-SHM-CGC, 2018 WL 1053548, at *8 (W.D.
Tenn. Feb. 26, 2018), recon. denied, No. 17-cv-2535-SHM-CGC, 2018 WL 1884825 (W.D. Tenn.
Apr. 19, 2018).
163. See, e.g., Coleman v. Hennessy, No. 17-cv-06503-EMC, 2018 WL 541091, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 5, 2018); Rodriguez-Ziese v. Hennessy, No. 17-cv-06473-BLF, 2017 WL 6039705, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 6, 2017).
164. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“The right to release before trial is conditioned
upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if
found guilty.”).
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in bail-reform litigation. It should become even more so. There are
practical reasons that courts may resist treating unaffordable bail as a
de facto denial of bail, but they are not legitimate grounds for
resistance. There is also a more conceptual argument that an
unaffordable bail condition is not precisely the equivalent of a denial
of bail, especially at the margin of affordability. Yet we must draw the
line of “unaffordability” somewhere. Beyond the threshold of what we
can reasonably expect a person to pay, a monetary bail condition
becomes the functional equivalent of an order imposing detention.
Recognizing unaffordable bail as a de facto detention order
foregrounds the challenge ahead for the bail reform movement:
clarifying the substantive and procedural criteria for locking up a
presumptively innocent person while his case unfolds.

